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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL OPPORTUNISM 
AND CONTRACTING MECHANISMS 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between 
organizations. We specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal 
nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. We use a 
unique data set of 102 buyer-supplier disputes to explore in depth different types of 
opportunism—that is, strong form versus weak form opportunism—and different types of 
contracting mechanisms—that is, the controlling and coordinating functions of formal contracts 
and the cooperative and competitive sides of relational contracts. Our detailed empirical analysis 
suggests distinct relationships between the different contracting mechanisms, the different types 
of opportunism, and the level of legal fees necessary to deal with the dispute. These findings 
enable us to derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing 
with interorganizational opportunism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The risk of opportunism is often seen as an inherent feature of interorganizational relationships. 
In this regard, opportunism—or self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1985)—represents 
one of the central assumptions underlying transaction cost economics (TCE). As Williamson 
(1993: 97) states ‘huge numbers of interesting problems of economic organization are missed or 
misconstrued if opportunism is ignored or suppressed. But for opportunism, most forms of 
complex contracting and hierarchy vanish.’ 
Williamson (1985) largely regards opportunism as a behavioral trait embodied in economic 
actors. In spite of its theoretical and practical prominence, empirical research on opportunism is 
still relatively sparse (Das and Rahman, 2002; Jap and Anderson, 2003). Although TCE research 
has traditionally discussed opportunism as a general concept, the potential for different types of 
opportunistic behaviors to emerge has been understudied (Macher and Richman, 2008). Thus, 
whereas opportunism has a central position in TCE, there is still a need to clarify how it 
manifests itself in an exchange relationship. 
At the same time, TCE addresses the problem of organization as one of devising contractual 
governance structures that have the purpose of safeguarding transactions against the hazards of 
opportunism. Although much research—both in management and economics—has shown that 
exchange relationships are commonly governed by a combination of relational and formal 
contracting mechanisms (e.g., Baker et al., 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), we still do not know 
much about the influence of governance structures on the types of opportunism. This is all the 
more surprising because this issue is at the heart of the TCE research agenda (Williamson, 2003). 
The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of contracting mechanisms in 
interorganizational relationships with opportunism. On the one hand, prior literature on 
opportunism has suggested a distinction between formal and informal breaches of the contract—
3 
!
or strong form versus weak form opportunism (Luo, 2006; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Williamson, 
1993). On the other hand, scholars in economics and management studying contracts have 
pointed out the existence of formal and informal contracts (e.g., Baker et al., 2002; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). Our data allow us to explore an intriguing question: are there some relationships 
between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature 
of contractual governance? 
Instead of testing a given model, we use an inductive approach to focus on a detailed empirical 
analysis. We thereby respond to recent calls (e.g., Hambrick, 2007; Oxley et al., 2010) for 
empirical research contributing substantively to a better understanding of an important 
phenomenon in strategic organization. We use a unique data set of 102 buyer-supplier disputes to 
explore in depth different types of opportunism and contracting mechanisms. The data, collected 
through a law firm, includes all of the correspondence and other documents exchanged between 
the disputing parties and their lawyers for each case. We were also able to access the original 
contracts designed by the trading partners along with additional background information on the 
firms involved. 
Three main findings emerge from our analysis: (1) strong form opportunism tends to be 
associated with relatively higher legal fees than weak form opportunism, (2) control and 
coordination dimensions of formal contracts seem to be associated with lower legal fees and 
lower likelihood of strong form opportunism, and (3) our analysis does not show any specific 
pattern between the nature of relational contracts and amount of legal fees or the types of 
opportunism. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We start by describing in detail our data and 
methods. We then present the results of our empirical analysis on the relationships among (1) the 
types of opportunism and the level of legal fees, (2) the contracting mechanisms and the level of 
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legal fees, and (3) the contracting mechanisms and the types of opportunism. We then compare 
our observations with theoretical and empirical literature in management and economics. The 
discussion of relevant convergences and divergences between our empirical results and existing 
research leads us to suggest possible avenues for additional inquiry for the strategic organization 
of contracting. 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH: A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF LAW FIRM’S FILES 
Data collection on dispute cases 
We collected our data in an independent law firm; a mid-sized firm managed by the same team of 
partners since the beginning of the 1990s. The opportunity to study cases was a unique way to 
have access to a large sample of disputes with real contractual documents and very rich details on 
the profiles of the disputants and the context of the dispute. 
Lawyers’ notes have some attractive features as a data source for our study of interorganizational 
opportunism. As it was confirmed during our complementary interviews with lawyers and our 
period of observation within the law firm, firms involved in such disputes are aware of the 
importance of keeping track of their communications with their partners. In particular, lawyers 
directly support their clients in documenting the file and managing the overall process (see, for 
example, Berger, 2006; Murray et al., 1989; Sampson, 2003). 
Our sample includes all the cases handled by this law firm between 1991 and 2005—102 cases in 
all—that involved disputes arising in exchange relationships between a buyer and a supplier.1 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Contracts involving more than two parties represent a small minority of the cases handled by the law firm. Because 
it is more difficult to identify specific violations and solutions, we excluded these multilateral disputes from our 
sample. Our sampling requirement was that the case involved a vertical relationship between only two partners; this 
led to the exclusion of 26 cases in total. To check for potential bias, differences between included and excluded files 
and firms were examined. T-tests of the differences of means suggest that files and firms excluded from the sample 
did not significantly differ from those included along any observable dimension other than those used to limit the 
sample. Results are available on request. 
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Each legal file for each of the 102 disputes contains between 800 and 5,000 pages; this includes 
all documents issued by each party in the contract and exchanged during the dispute-resolution 
process. In addition to mandatory legal documents, the lawyers in each case requested from their 
clients all possible relevant information that could explain their situation and their perception of 
the conflict. 
One of the co-authors spent four months in the law firm to collect data and gain insights into the 
legal system and the way of doing business in the law firm. In addition to daily conversations 
with lawyers and administrative staff, 17 interviews were conducted with other lawyers and law 
professors who specialize in contract law. Due to the highly confidential character of the data, it 
was not possible to speak directly with the firms involved in the disputes, nor is it possible to 
disclose their identities. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE OF DISPUTES AND TYPES OF OPPORTUNISM 
Overview of the sample 
Ninety-nine of the 102 cases involved only European firms; three also involved non-European 
firms. Because some companies were involved in several cases and were established clients at the 
law firm, the sample contained 178 different companies. The firms in our sample came from a 
variety of industries: manufacturing (52 percent), services (32 percent), retail (15 percent), and 
construction (2 percent). The contracts represented different types of transactions with a roughly 
even split across distribution contracts (35.3 percent), production supply contracts (29.4 percent), 
and IT contracts (26.5 percent); there were a smaller number of contracts for consulting and other 
services (8.8 percent). 
The issues underlying the dispute also varied across relationships, and in some cases the disputes 
evolved over time in size and scope. Four primary types of conflicts were identifiable at the 
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outset of the disputes: issues regarding deal scope and deliverables (40.2 percent), work quality 
(23.5 percent), work delays (21.6 percent), and payment (14.7 percent). Sixty percent of the cases 
ended in litigation and 40 percent were eventually settled via private resolution processes. Of the 
cases 32.4 percent included exchange partners that had interacted with each other previously and 
46 percent of the cases involved cross-border relationships. Further details about the nature and 
characteristics of the deals involved in our sample are reported in Table 1. 
––– Insert Table 1 about here ––– 
 
Representativeness of the sample 
Because all of the relationships we study involve disputes, it is important to consider the 
representativeness of our sample. To probe that our sample is representative of the full population 
of contracts, we compared our sample with other general samples of contracts; that is, not 
specifically ending up in disputes. As it is not possible to gather our own control group of firms 
that engaged in contracts and did not have disputes—and, for instance, operate a Heckman 
correction—, we compared our sample with the content of other academic articles describing 
with sufficient details their sample of contractual agreements. 
We completed a literature review of the studies focusing on contractual complexity in 
interorganizational relationships not specifically ending up in dispute. We found two samples 
with a clear description of the contractual complexity’s distribution: Reuer and Ariño’s (2002; 
2007) sample of 88 alliances involving Spanish firms of various sizes from a variety of industries 
and Reuer et al.’s (2006) sample of 66 alliances in the German telecommunications industry. 
In order to compare our sample with those two other samples of contracts, we recoded the 102 
contracts in our sample following Parkhe’s (1993) approach (i.e., level of contractual detail 
between 0 and 8) to get the same operationalization of contractual complexity. 
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First, on Parkhe’s unweighted index of complexity—which tabulates the presence of up to eight 
key contractual clause categories—our sample’s score (4.36) is situated between the score (3.69) 
for Reuer and Ariño’s (2002; 2007) sample and the score (5.05) of Reuer et al. (2006) sample. 
Second, we compared the distribution of contractual complexity of the contracts in our sample 
with the distribution of contractual complexity in Reuer et al.’s (2006) sample (to the best of our 
knowledge, the Reuer et al.’s (2006) article is the only one that details the distribution of 
contractual provisions and can thus serve as a benchmark). We did not find a statistically 
significant difference between the two samples (Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9581). 
Third, in Figure1, we made a comparison of the frequency of each clause in each of the three 
samples. 
––– Insert Figure 1 about here ––– 
No specific difference emerges between our sample of contracts and the two other samples of 
contracts not specifically ending up in dispute. We followed-up with a series of t-tests to compare 
the three samples. We did not find a statistically significant difference between our sample and 
the two other samples on the overall contractual complexity (Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9667). Furthermore, 
Reuer and Ariño (2007) factor analyzed Parkhe’s eight provisions and found that the first three 
provisions of Parkhe’s 8-item index relate primarily to coordination (i.e., Clauses #1, #2, and #3), 
whereas the remaining five relate primarily to control (i.e., Clauses #4, #5, #6, #7, and #8). 
Again, we did not find a statistically significant difference between our sample and the two other 
samples on the level of contractual coordination (Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7132) and on the level of 
contractual control (Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7694). 
All in all, these analyses suggest that our sample appears, a priori, to consist of contracts that do 
not differ significantly from the general population of (nondispute) contracts. Although such 
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analyses cannot eliminate the possibility of selective representation, it does mitigate such 
concerns. We come back to this issue in our discussion. 
 
A detailed example of dispute 
In order to clarify the empirical context of our research, it may be helpful to provide an example 
of a dispute from our sample. In January 2003, a small French firm specializing in machinery 
contracted with a mid-sized Austrian firm in the electrical equipment industry. It was planned 
that the Austrian firm would manufacture specialized components that would be used by the 
French firm. The contract specified in great detail how firms had to share information and 
coordinate their activities on a weekly basis for the development of the specialized components 
(i.e., coordination clauses2). However, no specific clause of monitoring or penalty system had 
been drafted in the contract (i.e., no control clauses). After a few months of collaboration, the 
French firm became increasingly skeptical about the ability of its supplier to develop the 
specialized components under the conditions that had been promised in the contract (i.e., strong 
form opportunism). After a few meetings with its partner firm and still not managing to resolve 
the problem, the French firm decided that it was time to engage the services of a law firm (which 
eventually provided us with our data). The dispute continued for another nine months, at which 
point it was privately settled without going to court. The legal fees added up to €21,180 for the 
French firm. 
 
Distinguishing between two forms of opportunism 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The terms ‘coordination clauses,’ ‘control clauses,’ and ‘weak/strong form opportunism’ are further explained 
shortly. 
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The traditional view (e.g., Williamson, 1985) equates opportunism with violations of explicit 
contractual obligations. More recently, however, this ‘strong form’ view of opportunism has been 
augmented to include the possibility of violations of the spirit of an agreement (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1993). Defined as ‘weak form’ opportunism, it involves a relational 
norm violation that is not spelled out in the formal contract but rather embedded in the common 
understanding between the trading partners. 
Our empirical approach evaluates opportunistic behaviors from the firms’ perspectives.3 We 
assess opportunism by examining complaints voiced by the firms in letters and documents 
exchanged with their exchange partner and recorded in the law firm’s files. The use of secondary 
data gathered ex post but reflecting real-time information is a good way to limit social desirability 
bias, ex post rationalization, and retrospective errors (Miller et al., 1997). 
As both strong form and weak form opportunism may be perceived within the same dispute, we 
see opportunism as two different constructs. The key distinction between strong form and weak 
form opportunism is that strong form opportunism describes the strategic manipulation of 
information and misrepresentations that involve violations of contractual obligations that are 
explicitly codified in a contract (Luo, 2006). By contrast, weak form opportunism refers to 
situations in which there is a perceived relational norm violation, that is, violation of an 
obligation not spelled out in the formal contract but embedded in the common understanding of 
the trading partners. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In line with prior empirical works on opportunism, we think that ‘opportunistic behavior is almost impossible to 
observe firsthand’ (Provan and Skinner, 1989: 206). Following the approach used in most of the few articles that 
contain an empirical study on opportunism, we looked at the opportunism perceived by firms (e.g., Gassenheimer et 
al., 1996; Weaver and Dickson, 1998).!
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In order to develop appropriate measures of strong form and weak form opportunisms, a team of 
two researchers developed a list of relevant concepts and preliminary response categories to use 
for information coding (see Table 2). 
––– Insert Table 2 about here ––– 
Following this, all documents exchanged by the parties were read and coded independently by 
both researchers. We then proceeded with an item selection and classification process. To 
systematize the data coding, we used a computer-based qualitative analysis with Concordance 
software. We then compared our respective coding of each file and the few disagreements were 
solved by discussion. We developed four alternative approaches to coding opportunism in our 
sample of disputes. 
First, we focused on the initial perception of opportunism at the onset of the dispute. Our 
interviews with the lawyers and our analysis of the data indicate that the nature of the contentious 
issue at the origin of the conflict greatly affects conflict development. We used a binary variable 
(strong form opportunism = 1 versus weak form opportunism = 0) to measure the perceived form 
of opportunism at the onset of the dispute. Fifty-two disputes in our sample started with a 
perception of weak form opportunism and 50 disputes with strong form opportunism. 
Second, as strong form opportunism and weak form opportunism are not mutually exclusive, we 
investigated the possible coexistence of the types of opportunism during a given dispute. We then 
analyzed each of the 2,261 messages exchanged between the parties in the 102 disputes. Based on 
this second way to code opportunism, it appears that strong form opportunism was manifested in 
83 percent and weak form opportunism in 78 percent of the disputes in our sample. 
Third, in order to reflect to what extent strong form or weak form opportunism dominates in a 
given conflict, we developed a continuum measure from a strong form to a weak form. We used a 
continual reading of the strength of strong form opportunism, measured as (# of messages with 
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strong form opportunism) / (# of messages with weak form opportunism + # of messages with 
strong form opportunism). This variable has a minimum of 0, a maximum of 1, and an average of 
0.52. 
Finally, we coded strong form and weak form opportunism as two distinct continuous variables 
(rather than a proportion of strong versus weak) through the number of messages for strong form 
opportunism and weak form opportunism in a given dispute. 
In order to better evaluate the distribution and relationships between the two forms of 
opportunism, we drew a plot of the messages about opportunism ranked by (1) the total number 
of messages and (2) the proportion of messages about strong form versus weak form 
opportunism.!
––– Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here ––– 
No immediate clear pattern appeared: we found cases with a few mentions of opportunism (i.e., 
one or two messages) involving either strong form or weak form opportunism. We also found 
cases involving either only strong form or weak form opportunism with a higher total number of 
messages (i.e., around five messages). However, in the cases with a lot of messages about 
opportunism (i.e., eight or more), we systematically found a mix of strong form and weak form 
opportunism. 
 
Forms of opportunism and legal fees 
The next step of our empirical investigation is to look at the potentially distinct influences of each 
form of opportunism. Prior studies have considered a number of consequences of opportunism, 
such as its influence on performance (e.g., Gassenheimer et al., 1996), firm boundaries (e.g., 
Steensma and Corley, 2001), or commitment (e.g., Skarmeas et al., 2002). The influence of 
opportunism on costs has not been directly studied so far except for Dahlstrom and Nygaard 
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(1999). However, Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) do not consider distinct forms of opportunism. 
Thus, in the next section, we probe the distinct influence of each form of opportunism at the level 
of legal fees. 
Few studies in TCE directly examine the costs of conducting exchanges in interfirm relationships 
(Artz and Brush, 2000; Masten et al., 1991); as such, there is little guidance available about the 
appropriate measures of enforcement costs or, more specifically, legal fees. Here, we measure 
lawyer’s fees, that is, the compensation the law firm receives from its clients for resolving 
situations of perceived opportunism (logarithmic value in thousands of inflation-adjusted Euros). 
This gave us an estimate of the main direct costs associated with the time, effort, and expertise 
necessary for the dispute resolution. 
Legal fees reflect through a unique monetary variable the different tasks done by the diverse 
protagonists at the law firm (senior lawyers, junior lawyers, interns, and staff). Given our sample, 
comparisons were possible and relevant between files because the invoicing process was clearly 
delineated by the law firm. With a single firm sample, we are able to directly observe the billing 
process and can be confident that differences in fees are driven by the duration and complexity of 
dispute resolution.4 The advantages associated with our data source (and our exclusive focus on 
exchanges that have experienced a dispute) naturally come at the cost of some limitations on the 
generalizability of our findings. These limitations are discussed in detail at the end of the paper. 
We conduct a series of tests to investigate the influence of the form of opportunism on the level 
of legal fees. First, a simple t-test shows that the difference between the two forms of 
opportunism is significant (mean of legal fees = 2.11 when the opportunism at the onset of the 
dispute is a ‘strong’ form and mean of legal fees = 1.28 when the opportunism at the onset of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Consistent with TCE, ‘transaction costs are always assessed in a comparative way, in which one mode of 
contracting is compared with another. Accordingly, it is the difference between, rather than, the absolute magnitude 
of transaction costs that matters’ (Williamson, 1985: 22). 
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dispute is a ‘weak’ form; Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000). Second, in Figure 3, we created a scatter plot of 
the level of legal fees and the relative intensity of strong form opportunism with our measure: (# 
of messages with strong form opportunism) / (# of messages with weak form opportunism + # of 
messages with strong form opportunism). 
––– Insert Figure 3 about here ––– 
This figure suggests that disputes involving a high level of strong form opportunism (relative to 
the total number of messages exchanged between the partners about opportunism) tend to be 
associated with higher legal fees. 
Third, we estimate the relationship between the types of opportunism and the legal fees with five 
specifications in Table 3. In the first column, we include only the control variables we discussed 
previously. In the four other columns, we test the relationship among each of our four ways to 
code opportunism and legal fees. 
––– Insert Table 3 about here ––– 
Across the different specifications, two patterns emerge. First, it appears that disputes with strong 
form opportunism (either at the onset or during the dispute) are associated with relatively higher 
legal fees than disputes with weak form opportunism (everything else being equal). Second, 
disputes with a relatively high level of strong form opportunism appear to be linked with higher 
legal fees. Such results suggest that each type of opportunism is likely to be associated with 
significantly different amounts of legal fees. 
 
FORMAL AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING MECHANISMS 
The next step of our investigation is to examine the relationship between the contracting 
mechanisms and (1) the level of legal fees and (2) the types of opportunism. Our data allow us to 
explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the 
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formal versus relational nature of contractual governance. Thus, in the next section, we continue 
our empirical investigation by focusing on the nature of the formal contracts and then the nature 
of the relational contracts before turning to the possible links between contracting mechanisms 
and (1) the level of legal fees and (2) the types of opportunism. 
 
Investigation of the formal contracts 
Our empirical investigation is driven by the desire to get a better understanding of contractual 
governance mechanisms in a context of interorganizational opportunism. TCE has suggested that 
governance forms ‘are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by 
different abilities to adapt to disturbances’ (Williamson, 1991: 269); however, ‘the 
dimensionalization of governance structures has been relatively slighted’ (Williamson, 1991: 
277). 
Research on contractual governance has emphasized the need for more detailed and more 
extensive measures of contract provisions to improve empirical work in this area (e.g., Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). At the same time, recent research has pointed out the multiple dimensions of 
contracts (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; Ryall and Sampson, 2009) and 
has suggested that there are two main reasons why partners in interfirm relationships draw up 
formal contracts: control and coordination. First, contractual control attempts to create adherence 
to a desired outcome with a minimal amount of deviant behavior through the exercise of authority 
or power mechanisms. Second, because of a clear definition of roles and information sharing, 
contractual coordination can be approached more as a way to achieve a desired collective 
outcome and to facilitate goal congruence by providing the appropriate linkages between the two 
partners. 
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We follow this distinction to analyze the simultaneous presence of control devices and 
coordination features and develop a detailed assessment of contractual clauses in 
interorganizational relationships. It helps us in particular to clarify the different facets of 
contractual complexity. Our study of formal contracts is based on close examination of the actual 
contracts signed by the firms, which lay out in detail all the relevant clauses. Following an 
extensive review of the relevant empirical literature, we worked in close cooperation with four 
legal experts specializing in contract law (three of whom are practicing lawyers). The purpose of 
this collaboration was to develop appropriate measures of the control and coordination features of 
the contracts in our sample. Following accepted practices in the literature (Parkhe, 1993; Reuer 
and Ariño, 2007), we used a checklist of key clauses to develop these measures. 
We operationalized the controlling function of the contract through five factors: (1) right to 
audit/inspection, (2) safeguarding the system, (3) control by a third party, (4) having a penalty 
clause, and (5) having a resolution clause. The measure is therefore defined as ∑ Di; Di = 1 if 
provision i exists; Di = 0 otherwise. The summation is an integer variable ranging from 0 to 5. 
The coordinating function of the contract can be described through five key clauses: (1) 
assignment of roles and responsibilities, (2) indication of duration and conditions of renewal, (3) 
organizational coordination—ability to reassign tasks among participants without altering the 
goal of the contractual arrangement, (4) strategic coordination—a process that is set up to 
redefine the objectives of the relationship, and (5) dispute resolution—an arbitration/mediation 
clause. The measure for the controlling dimension is defined as ∑ Di; Di = 1 if provision i exists; 
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Di = 0 otherwise. The summation is also an integer variable ranging from 0 to 5. Examples for 
each type of clause are shown in Table 4.5 
––– Insert Table 4 about here ––– 
As an additional validity check on our measures of contractual control and coordination we 
contacted six other legal experts, all professors in contract law, and asked each to evaluate the 
level of contractual control and the level of contractual coordination of five randomly selected 
contracts in our data set. We then conducted interviews with each of these experts guided by a 
structured questionnaire.6 Each interview lasted between one and one-half and three hours. We 
calculated the intraclass correlation coefficients of the six experts for each of the two contractual 
functions (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The two values are significant at the .001 level, indicating 
high inter-rater reliability (.988 for the controlling function and .980 for the coordinating 
function). Thus, the expert ratings are highly internally consistent, which in turn suggests low 
random and specific errors. Finally, we compared the experts’ results with our own evaluations of 
the sample contracts. We also found a strong convergence. Indeed, the experts’ average ratings 
concurred with our own approach (.995 for contractual control and .991 for contractual 
coordination; both significant at the .001 level). 
Furthermore, we conducted a follow-up analysis to evaluate the robustness of our coding scheme. 
We reanalyzed all coordination and control clauses in our sample by adding an interpretative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Our decision to adopt an unweighted summation of individual contract clauses in our two measures of contractual 
functions also follows earlier research (Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006; Lui and Ngo, 2004; Ryall and Sampson, 
2009).!
6 We contacted six other contract law experts to evaluate the same five randomly selected contracts in our data set. 
Each expert was asked to make 50 assessments (5 contracts * 2 functions * 5 criteria). Our interviews were 
organized around the following questions: 
- For this contract, please evaluate the presence or absence of the 10 following clauses [this question was then 
repeated for four other contracts] 
- How do you characterize each of these five contracts? (independently and comparatively) 
- As for the controlling aspects, how do you characterize each of these five contracts? (independently and 
comparatively)!
- As for the coordinating aspects, how do you characterize each of these five contracts? (independently and 
comparatively)!
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coding step that takes into account the inherent complexity of contractual provisions. In this step, 
a rater eliminated all clauses that seemed ambiguous—that is, those that did not clearly suggest a 
coordination versus control function as would be implied by our initial coding scheme. This 
coding required not only that the rater read the text of each clause as written, but to also consider 
the context in which the clause was introduced and embedded. To test the reliability of this 
alternative measure, a second rater evaluated 10 randomly selected clauses for each of the 10 
types of provisions. Out of the 100 clauses checked by both raters, the level of agreement is 89 
percent. This more conservative measure of coordination versus control provisions led us to 
delete 7.25 percent of the coordination provisions and 11.14 percent of the control provisions. 
Rerunning the analyses with the revised measure gave us results—not reported but available on 
request—that were almost identical to those of our initial coding. 
Figures 4a and 4b show the heterogeneity of the complexity of formal contracts in our sample 
using the frequency distribution of the number of observations for each level of controlling and 
coordinating clauses. 
––– Insert Figures 4a and 4b about here ––– 
 
Investigation of the relational contracts 
In the wake of scholars who emphasized the importance of informal agreements in organizations 
(Blau, 1955; Simon, 1947), economists and management scholars have pointed out the role of 
relational contracts7 to circumvent difficulties in formal contracting (Baker et al., 2002; Levin, 
2003). In addition to formal contracts existing between parties, relational contracts—that is, 
informal agreements and informal codes—affect the behaviors of parties (Bolton and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 We use the terms informal contracts and relational contracts interchangeably. In fact, ‘contracts we call 
“relational” are sometimes called “self-enforcing” (Telser, 1981; Klein, 1996), “implicit” (MacLeod and 
Malcomson, 1989), or both (Bull, 1987)’ (Baker et al., 2002: 40; see also Gil, 2011).!
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Dewatripont, 2005) through accumulated experience, self-enforcing mechanisms, and the 
development of a community of interest (e.g., Bull, 1987; Corts and Singh, 2004; Hart and 
Moore, 1988; Kenney and Klein, 2000). 
We use two alternative measures to probe relational contracts in our sample. First, based on a 
double rating, we evaluated relational contracts between firms by looking at records to see if it 
mentioned nothing about a past relationship between the two firms (0) or some past relationship 
between the two firms (e.g., ‘Our teams worked together last month for the [ABC] contract’) (1). 
Such a measure is in line with prior research on interfirm relationships, which has used the mere 
existence of a buyer-supplier relationship, regardless of the parties’ attitude toward the 
relationship, as an indicator of their relationships (see, e.g., Carson et al., 2006; Corts and Singh, 
2004). 
Second, our data allow us to go one step further and investigate the quality of the relational 
contract between parties. As suggested by Ryall and Sampson (2009: 914), ‘prior deals are an 
imperfect measure for both approaches, capturing all prior deals whether positive or not (and 
therefore not necessarily facilitating trust development).’ Information on the relational experience 
prior to the dispute is drawn from copies of exchanges between the partners as well as from 
lawyers’ notes in the dispute files. These notes are compiled during the normal course of events 
at the first meetings between the lawyer and the client during the focal dispute. In addition to 
understanding the origins of the current dispute, during these initial meetings lawyers routinely 
interview the client regarding the nature of any previous exchanges between the firms and the 
behavior of the other party in these prior contracts. 
To distinguish between cooperative and competitive relational contracts, we first developed a 
preliminary list of relevant response categories for use in coding. Extant research on attitudes 
toward, and satisfaction in, trading relationships suggests three highly interrelated dimensions of 
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the higher order construct of cooperative relational norms: flexibility, participation, and solidarity 
(Heide and John, 1992; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Noordewier et al., 1990). 
Similar to the coding of the types of opportunism, we followed the Weber (1990) coding 
protocol. The level of agreement between the raters (all superior to 95%) and the correlation 
between the ratings (all superior to .90 at the 0.001 level) indicate a high degree of consistency in 
the ratings. Any residual disagreements on ratings were resolved by discussion. 
Relational contract was constructed as a categorical variable and coded as follows: Cooperative 
relational contract = 1 if the file contains explicit references to flexibility, participation, and/or 
solidarity in prior interactions between the partners; 0 otherwise. Competitive relational contract 
= 1 if the file contains explicit references to inflexibility, nonparticipation, and/or individualism 
in prior business interactions between the partners; 0 otherwise. Files coded as zero on both 
measures were cases with no reference to any transactions between the firms prior to the start of 
the contract under dispute. Table 5 gives examples of statements for each type of relational 
contract. 
––– Insert Table 5 about here ––– 
In Table 6, we examine separately our key variables of interest in (1) our overall sample (N = 
102) and then in our different subsamples: (2) cases in which firms had no prior exchange (N = 
69), (3) cases in which firms had prior exchange (N = 33), (4) cases in which firms had a 
cooperative relational contract (N = 17), and (5) cases in which firms had a competitive relational 
contract (N = 13). We calculate the mean difference tests for each sample and its complement. 
Interestingly, the tests do not reveal any significant differences between the different subsamples. 
––– Insert Table 6 about here ––– 
We explore the relationship between the types of contracting mechanisms—formal and 
informal—and the level of legal fees with four specifications in Table 7a. 
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––– Insert Table 7a about here ––– 
The regressions suggest that higher levels of control clauses and coordination clauses of the 
formal contracts are associated with fewer legal fees. However, this part of the analysis does not 
show any specific pattern between the nature of the relational contracts and the level of legal fees. 
In Table 7b, we conduct analyses between the types of contracting mechanisms—formal and 
informal—and the forms of opportunism. We use probit for our binary measure of opportunism at 
the onset of the dispute (strong form = 1; weak form = 0) in columns 1a to 4a and OLS for our 
measure of the intensity of strong form opportunism (relative to the total number of messages 
exchanged between the partners about opportunism) in columns 1b to 4b. Across the different 
specifications, it seems that the two dimensions of formal contracts (i.e., control and 
coordination) tend to be linked with a lower likelihood of strong form opportunism (as perceived 
at the onset of the dispute) as well as in disputes in which strong form opportunism is relatively 
lower. 
––– Insert Table 7b about here ––– 
 
DISCUSSION 
As mentioned previously, our purpose is not theory evaluation but an exploratory analysis of 
interorganizational opportunism and contracting mechanisms. In the following discussion, we 
first revisit the empirical issues about the validity of our empirical analysis. As we explain below, 
our results can only support claims that are tentative and suggestive. We then open a discussion 
to invite other scholars in strategic organization to tackle the theoretical issues raised on 
interorganizational opportunism and contracting mechanisms and refine our findings with a 
sounder research design. 
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Endogeneity issues 
Repeated calls have been made to pay attention to endogeneity issues (e.g., Bascle, 2008). We 
acknowledge that any such study of contracting mechanisms—like all organizational design 
problems—will inevitably raise the issue of endogeneity (Oxley and Wada, 2009; Shaver, 1998). 
When firms draft their contracts, it is possible that they do so selectively in anticipation of the 
likelihood of opportunism, the type of opportunism likely to arise, and the costs it would involve. 
This suggests that the contracting mechanisms might be endogenous because parties design their 
agreements based on objectives other than those directly governing their transaction. Biased 
coefficient estimates and misleading conclusions might be drawn when strategy performance 
estimates do not account for the endogeneity in strategy choice (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998). Unobserved factors may drive observed differences in the type 
of opportunism and the level of legal fees, rendering observed correlations spurious. 
Ideally, we would estimate a two-stage least squares model in which the first-stage specification 
explains the nature of the contracting mechanisms as a function of some instrumental variables. 
Unfortunately, a full-blown causal identification strategy—meeting both the conditions of 
relevance and exogeneity (Murray, 2006; Woolridge, 2002)—was practically not feasible. We 
therefore remain circumspect in interpreting our results. 
In addition, we have tried to be as sensitive as possible to potential alternative relationships and 
to include an extensive set of control variables. In particular, if the formal contract is an outcome 
of a previous buyer-supplier interaction and embodies the norms that govern the relationship, 
then we would expect that parties with cooperative relational contracts would develop formal 
contracts embodying relational norms to continue to enhance the relationship. Furthermore, we 
would expect that parties with competitive relational contracts would negotiate formal contracts 
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embodying their relational contracts. However, if we examine the data (reported in Table 8), we 
see that this is simply not the case. 
––– Insert Table 8 about here ––– 
Scholars are divided about the effects of partnering experience on formal governance structure 
(Lumineau et al., 2011; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). Although some prior studies argue that 
increased familiarity with the partner enhances the ability to design contractual structures 
(Dekker, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) and others argue that partner experience reduces the 
need for extensive governance structures (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Zollo et al., 2002), our 
findings do not reveal any significant relationship between the type of relational contract and the 
nature of formal contracts. For instance, although we observe relatively less contractual control 
for deals in which partners had a prior relationship (2.69) than for first deals between parties 
(2.86), this difference is not significant. 
We now link our empirical findings with existing literature in management and economics on 
interorganizational opportunism and contracting mechanisms. Our purpose here is mostly to raise 
questions and to lay the foundation for interesting follow-on work on the strategic organization of 
contracting. 
 
The relationship between the forms of opportunism and legal fees 
Our findings suggest that each form of opportunism—strong versus weak—is likely to lead to 
different amounts of legal fees. Such patterns can be linked with the literature on self-enforcing 
contracts (Klein, 1996; Klein and Murphy, 1988; Srinivasan and Brush, 2006), which suggest that 
the verifiability of outcomes influences the enforceability of contracts (Baker, 2002; Baker et al., 
2002; Kvaloy and Olsen, 2009). 
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One way to interpret our findings is to consider that when a firm violates an exchange agreement 
in areas that are addressed in the contract—that is, engages in strong form opportunism—the 
behavior tends to be observable by the parties taking part in the exchange and verifiable by the 
courts. When the dispute directly involves juridical aspects, it may seem rational for the firm to 
invest in the juridical expertise of its lawyers. The firm may consider that the benefits of an 
investment in lawyers’ resources are worth the costs (i.e., the expenses in legal fees). For 
instance, it may seem more likely that the opportunistic partner will be sanctioned because of the 
lawyers’ findings. As a result, lawyers are likely to be more involved and deploy more efforts to 
try to prove which firm is right and which firm is wrong, and legal fees may be relatively high as 
a result. 
In contrast, when opportunism is perceived as a breach of the spirit of the agreement, the 
violation may be much more difficult to verify and sanction: whereas the signed contract is 
formally codified and has a legally binding effect on each party’s behavior, the implicit part of 
the agreement does not have such formally structured or documented legal obligations. Thus, 
contrary to strong form opportunism, there may be few explicit remedies or directions available 
in the case of weak form opportunism involving a violation of the spirit of the agreement (Luo, 
2006). Because weak form opportunism seems more difficult to enforce, firms may consider that 
the costs of lawyers’ involvement exceed the benefits. Thus, such reasoning could help to explain 
our empirical results that show, everything else being equal, that disputes involving strong form 
opportunism tend to be linked with relatively higher legal fees than disputes involving weak form 
opportunism. 
 
Contracting mechanisms in interorganizational opportunism 
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As we explained previously, our empirical analysis was motivated by the desire to get a better 
understanding of contractual governance mechanisms in a context of interorganizational 
opportunism. We thus started by disentangling the control and coordination dimensions of formal 
contracts. We now return to the empirical and theoretical implications of such a distinction in the 
relationship between formal contracts and (1) legal fees and (2) types of opportunism. 
 
Dimensions of the formal contracts and legal fees 
As our findings suggest, formal contracts can affect ex post transaction costs and, in particular, 
legal fees in a variety of ways. Such results call for further research on the different dimensions 
of formal contracts. Although prior literature has mostly perceived the formal contract as a 
controlling device (e.g., Williamson, 1985), complex formal contracts may also serve as a way to 
coordinate activities by supporting rational decision making (Lumineau et al., 2011). In our 
study, we have disentangled these two dimensions of formal contracts by looking in detail at the 
impact of different contractual safeguards (i.e., the controlling dimension and the coordinating 
dimension) on legal fees. 
The controlling side of the formal contract defines the rights and obligations of the involved 
parties (Lyons and Mehta, 1997). It gives exchange partners the right to sanction a party that does 
not perform according to the primary agreement. In that way, adding contractual control clauses 
to a contract may reduce the risk of costly defection or rent misappropriation because it is easier 
to detect and deal with divergence from the agreed terms of the exchange. In our initial example, 
the contract—empty of specific control clauses that inspect and monitor the partner’s activities—
did not allow the French firm to check the progress made by the Austrian firm. With such explicit 
provisions, parties could have incorporated enforcement features in a manner that is verifiable 
(and hence enforceable) by a third party (Srinivasan and Brush, 2006). Moreover, contractual 
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control can specify sanctions and penalties that encourage fulfillment of contractual obligations 
and can help resolve disputes when they arise through supervision and monitoring mechanisms or 
penalty clauses. 
Although the controlling function of contracts has been the most common focus of prior research, 
our study points out the role of the coordinating function of formal contracts. In addition to 
enhancing control, formal contracts may also help to define the objectives of the relationship, 
assign tasks among partners, or more generally serve as a framework to guide coordination (Mooi 
and Ghosh, 2010) and facilitate convergence of expectations (Malmgren, 1961), leading to a 
common understanding of what goals exchange partners wish to pursue and how they want to 
achieve these goals. Thus, the coordinating function of a contract refers to the organization of 
goals, priorities, and programs for the future; the ordering of the desires and expectations 
between or among the transacting parties; and the adjustment of individual behaviors to 
accommodate schedules and functions selected for mutual endeavors (Lumineau & Malhotra, 
2011; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). As our findings suggest, even in instances when opportunistic 
behavior arises during an exchange, coordinating clauses in a contract may still facilitate 
communication and information sharing based on the detailed task descriptions and a greater 
understanding of the assignment of roles and responsibilities of each party. To refer back to our 
initial example, the contract explicitly mentioned the priorities for each partner and the interfaces 
to jointly manage the French and Austrian companies’ collaboration. Clear lines of 
communication actually have been acknowledged as a key element of harmonious resolution in 
conflict situations (Cummings, 1984). Furthermore, for given transaction characteristics, the 
coordinating dimensions of the contract help to encourage and support knowledge building and to 
reduce exchange uncertainty. Over time, coordination shapes the emergence of shared 
understanding and common knowledge such as language and routine interactions between 
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exchange partners (Puranam et al., 2006). Their support of processes of feedback and efficient 
adjustments (Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000) may explain why they make handling cases of 
opportunistic dispute easier. Such coordinative aspects foster effective exchange and learning 
processes between trading firms, for instance, by detailing a process to redefine the objective or 
to reassign tasks among firms during their relationship. 
 
Dimensions of the formal contracts and forms of opportunism 
Our findings also suggest that the extent of controlling and coordinating clauses embedded in a 
formal contract may differentially affect the form of opportunistic behavior that one is likely to 
encounter during transaction execution. 
Control provisions (such as those specifying regular on-time delivery assessments or assurance 
inspections) reduce the ability of exchange partners to deviate from duties or obligations codified 
in the formal contract. They increase monitoring and scrutiny of partners’ activities (Provan, 
1993; Provan and Skinner, 1989) and help to check actions that are verifiably in conflict with 
codified contractual terms (Klein, 1996; Klein and Murphy, 1988). It would explain why, as we 
observed in our sample, increased contractual control tends to reduce strong form opportunism. 
At the same time, ‘when the balloon of opportunistic behavior is poked in one place by the blunt 
instrument of rational . . . control, it readily yields but re-emerges elsewhere in ways that may 
make it more difficult and costly to detect and curtail’ (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 24). Thus, 
such control provisions may have a different effect on weak form opportunism. Indeed, 
surveillance-oriented governance mechanisms consistently have been shown to have negative 
effects on attitudes toward the targeted behavior (Enzle and Anderson, 1993; Lepper and Greene, 
1975). Monitoring tools and other control provisions implemented by the trading partners may 
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therefore divert opportunistic actions away from actions codified in the written legal document 
toward actions and norms in the informal zones of the agreement (Nagin et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, when coordinating clauses are included in a formal contract, partners may be in a 
better position to communicate, establish, and maintain an interorganizational interface and make 
internal adjustments in response to a partner’s change in action. In fact, by facilitating interaction 
among participants on a project, coordinating aspects improve mutual adjustment (Thompson, 
1967) and mutually satisfactory compromise (Gundlach et al., 1995). As such, one would expect 
that violations of the contractual agreement would be reduced through the inclusion of more 
coordination clauses. Such features would particularly be well suited in preventing opportunistic 
actions that are unobservable—or observable but not verifiable by a third party—because they 
foster an ongoing and reciprocal pattern of interactions between the parties (Klein, 1996; 
Srinivasan and Brush, 2006). As our findings suggest, coordination provisions could reduce the 
likelihood of weak form opportunistic behavior by enabling firms to have a common 
understanding of their agreement. However, because coordination clauses rarely specify explicit 
rights and obligations, their impact on strong form opportunism is likely to be overlooked. Again, 
our findings suggest possible avenues for additional research on the different dimensions of 
contractual governance and their distinctive influences. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our exploratory study has five main implications for research on the strategic organization of 
contracting and opportunism. First, whereas opportunism has a central position in TCE, there is 
still a need to clarify how it manifests itself in an exchange relationship. Operationalizing a 
construct involves checking whether it is uni- or multidimensional (Tsang, 2006). Our study is 
among the first to investigate the underlying mechanisms of this core behavioral assumption. 
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This effort to theoretically and empirically distinguish strong form versus weak form 
opportunism thus contributes to reinforcing the foundation of TCE’s precepts. Our exploratory 
analysis of the multifaceted nature of opportunism is also a first step in helping to learn how it 
could be controlled more effectively (Luo, 2007). We thus specifically call for more research in 
this direction. 
Second, our detailed observations suggest that the different functions of the contract should be 
further incorporated into the governance literature. In line with Williamson’s (1991) theoretical 
insights, our empirical analysis suggests that different governance mechanisms possess inherent 
efficacy in handling opportunism and must be evaluated with respect to particular opportunistic 
disturbances. Taking this multidimensionality into account could benefit further research in TCE 
because it could help to explain how firms can strategically react to opportunistic disturbances 
and thus minimize some transaction costs. More broadly, we suggest that viewing the contractual 
governance through an overall lens is overly restrictive. By disentangling the two contractual 
dimensions of control and coordination, we further assess the dimensionalization of governance 
and the relative efficacy of alternative modes of organization. Our study extends here recent 
research on the strategic importance of “legal astuteness” as a valuable managerial capability that 
may provide a competitive advantage (Bagley, 2008). We thus call for greater awareness of both 
the different dimensions of contracts—e.g., control and coordination—and their multiple 
functions in specific contexts—e.g., organizing a transaction, preventing opportunism, or reacting 
to opportunism. The strategic organization literature could thereby extend our efforts to analyze 
the different facets of contractual design. 
Third, this study complements recent studies on self-enforcing agreements in management 
literature (Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Srinivasan and Brush, 2006). Although formal contracts are 
traditionally presented as enforceable by a third party but inflexible, our findings suggest that 
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coordination clauses are a means to help firms partly reap the benefits of flexibility and 
enforceability. This contractual dimension actually may combine some features of enforceability 
of formal contracts and flexibility of self-enforcing agreements. Such provisions may have some 
of the characteristics of flexibility of relational contracts because they allow parties to use their 
detailed knowledge of their specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes 
available. At the same time, because they occur in the framework of a legal device, they may be 
observable ex post by a third party. It therefore suggests that the relevant question is not just to 
know what to write in the contract but also how to write the contract. Governance choices not 
only have to be considered given initial transaction attributes but also in light of their efficacy to 
face ex post contingencies. Our study therefore suggests promising directions to explain why 
firms may decide to include coordinative provisions in their formal contract even if such terms 
cannot be easily enforced by third parties (Ryall and Sampson, 2009). 
Fourth, by leveraging our information regarding relational contracts, we introduced a distinction 
among competitive, cooperative, or nonexistent relational contracts. Not only did we devise a 
coding scheme, but we also suggest that this distinction extends prior research, which typically 
has considered relational contracts simply by evaluating only whether there were prior ties (e.g., 
Zollo et al., 2002). Evaluating presence as well as substance, we believe, provides a much better 
measure of relational contracting mechanisms. We invite additional inquiry to extend this 
qualitative distinction and to leverage it to probe the interplay of formal and informal governance 
mechanisms. 
Fifth, we also see great opportunities to extend our work by looking more precisely at what 
constitutes the violation of a norm.8 Beyond the existing governance structure and economic 
incentives, complementary work considering the firm as an arena for political leadership would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in this direction. 
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be valuable. It would be particularly interesting to study how managers can inspire firm members 
to transcend short-term self-interest and induce cooperativeness (Miller, 1992). The political 
skills of leaders may influence the shared perceptions of the organizational actors (Miller, 1992) 
and, in particular, their perception of weak form opportunism. We thus see avenues for future 
research on contracting mechanisms and opportunism bridging the literature about organizational 
economics and organizational behavior. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
First, some of the most important limitations come from the selection bias inherent in the sample 
available from our data source: law firm case notes. Our comparison of contracts in our sample 
with available benchmarks mitigates this concern because it suggests that our sample is quite 
representative of the broader universe of interorganizational relationships. Moreover, we do not 
observe disputes between exchange partners unless they escalate to the point in which lawyers 
become involved. We therefore may be observing a biased sample skewed toward the most 
serious disputes and the most challenging disturbances. In addition, our sample of disputes 
collected through a law firm may be biased toward disputes in which the legal issues related to 
the formal contract are prominent. Disputes involving less legal expertise and dealing mainly 
with the relational aspects of the agreement may be less likely to go through lawyers. Such a 
possibility may partly explain the lack of significance of relational contracts in our tests. 
Second, we believe that contractual measurement deserves further research. It is likely that some 
clauses are more important than others (1) in general and/or (2) from one transaction to another. 
It is also likely that there exist some interaction effects (positive or negative) between some sets 
of clauses. 
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Third, the central thrust of this article has been to offer insights into contracting mechanisms and 
opportunism. Our study was conducted essentially on firms from continental European countries 
with a legal system based on civil law. Future research in other institutional settings and areas 
would be valuable to confirm or discount our observations. 
Fourth, we focused on legal fees for the firms represented by the law firm from which we 
collected data. On the one hand, extensions could be made to include transactions for which law 
firms are not used to guaranteeing enforcement. On the other hand, we ignore the internal side of 
costs related to the resources mobilized within each firm involved in the relationship or their 
opportunity costs. There are many opportunities to probe more deeply into the different 
transaction costs at each stage of an interfirm relationship (e.g., front end versus back end) and to 
understand how they relate to each other. Complex contracts provide for flexible responses to 
opportunistic conditions; at the same time, inclusion of more contract terms leads to higher ex 
ante costs (Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Mooi and Ghosh, 2010). Thus the insertion of additional 
contract clauses affects the ex ante costs of negotiating and writing the contract and the ex post 
costs associated with monitoring and enforcement (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Scott and Triantis, 
2006). We call for more research to understand the trade-off between efficiently managing 
opportunism and economizing on governance costs. We especially consider that viewing 
opportunism as a policy variable that is subject to cost-benefit assessments represents an 
important avenue for further research and practice in the field of strategic organization. 
In summary, despite these limitations, our study reveals some thought-provoking patterns. Our 
unique data set has enabled us to develop a more detailed understanding of interorganizational 
opportunism and strategic organization of contracting. We hope that our study brings more 
attention to the role of contractual governance in dealing with opportunism. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics of the deals 
 
 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Type of transaction     
Distribution 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Services 0.08 0.28 0 1 
IT 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Production 
 
0.29 0.45 0 1 
International 
(Dummy variable with a value of 0 for relationships between firms from 
the same country and 1 for international relationships) 
 
0.46 0.50 0 1 
Revenues asymmetry between parties 
(Log [Absolute value [(Revenue of Firm A)-(Revenue of Firm B)] in 
thousands of inflation-adjusted Euros for the year in which the contract 
was signed). Data for this measure come from Bureau van Dijk’s 
AMADEUS database. 
 
7.66 0.96 5.16 10.28 
Time bound 
(Dummy variable reflecting the presence (1) or absence (0) of a 
prespecified duration of the relationship) 
 
0.65 0.47 0 1 
Technical detail 
(Log of the number of pages of technical specifications in the contract or 
its appendix) 
 
1.18 1.40 -0.69 4.8 
Asset specificity 
(Based on a content analysis of the legal file to look for references to 
tailored assets that support a given transaction, which cannot be 
redeployed easily outside of a particular exchange relationship) 
    
Human assets 
(Dummy variables indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of 
specialized skills, training needs, specific knowledge about a supplier’s 
particular product, and time and effort that go into learning about a 
supplier’s specific requirements) 
0.53 0.50 0 1 
Physical assets 
(Dummy variables indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of 
specialized assets for production, specialized production equipment, 
related interorganizational systems that link buyer and supplier 
production, and scheduling activities) 
0.46 0.50 0 1 
Site assets 
(Dummy variables indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of 
idiosyncratic investments in facilities and investment in dedicated 
facilities specific to this relationship) 
 
0.21 0.41 0 1 
N = 102!
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TABLE 2 
Examples of statements for each form of opportunism 
 
 
Form of opportunism Examples of statements 
 
Strong form 
opportunism 
- ‘You cheated on the agreed terms and provisions written in 
our contract.’ 
- ‘Your firm is deviating from the conditions specified in our 
contract.’ 
- ‘I remind you that Article 4 requires that . . . therefore, firm . . 
. does not fulfill its written commitments.’ 
 
Weak form  
opportunism 
- ‘You are not honoring your oral promise and are not 
respecting our implicit understanding.’ 
- ‘You withheld important information and thereby breached 
our unspoken promises.’ 
- ‘This lack of honesty does not coincide with the spirit of our 
agreement.’ 
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TABLE 3 
Forms of opportunism and legal fees 
 
Column (1): only control variables 
Column (2): strong form opportunism = 1 versus weak form opportunism = 0 
Column (3): absence/presence of strong form opportunism (0/1) and absence/presence of weak form opportunism (0/1) 
Column (4): intensity of strong form opportunism: (# of messages with strong form opportunism) / (# of messages with 
weak form opportunism + # of messages with strong form opportunism) 
Column (5): number of messages of strong form opportunism and number of messages of weak form opportunism 
 
 Legal fees 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
      
Opportunism (0/1)  0.82*** 
(0.06) 
   
Weak form opportunism (0/1)   -0.40*** 
(0.11) 
  
Strong form opportunism (0/1)   0.50*** 
(0.12) 
  
Intensity of strong form opportunism    0.99*** 
(0.10) 
 
Weak form opportunism (# of messages)     -0.07** 
(0.02) 
Strong form opportunism (# of messages)     0.10*** 
(0.02) 
Technical detail -0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
Time bound -0.14 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
Asymmetry -0.00 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
International -0.00 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.00 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Asset specificity – Human 0.06 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Asset specificity – Physical -0.20† 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.17† 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.16† 
(0.09) 
Asset specificity – Site -0.13 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
Prior relationship -0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.14 
(0.08) 
Distribution -0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.14† 
(0.08) 
-0.23† 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
Services -0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
IT -0.04 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
Constant 2.08*** 
(0.43) 
1.24*** 
(0.27) 
1.77*** 
(0.38) 
1.21*** 
(0.31) 
1.68*** 
(0.34) 
R2 0.21 0.71 0.45 0.61 0.53 
Adj R2 0.11 0.67 0.36 0.56 0.46 
N = 102; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standards errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4 
Examples of statements for each dimension of the formal contract 
 
 
Type of clauses Examples of statements 
 
Clauses of 
control 
 
- Right to audit/inspection: ‘Firm A maintains the right to audit Firm 
B’s manufacturing facility for conformance . . .’ 
- Safeguard/hostage clause: ‘Upon termination of the agreement, the 
Manufacturer shall repurchase the product stock from the 
Distributor . . .’ 
- Control/inspection by a third party: In a contract between Firm A 
and Firm B to supply product for final customer Firm C: ‘Firm C 
may at all reasonable times visit Firm A’s facilities and observe the 
work being performed.’ 
- Penalty clause: ‘If Firm A fails to complete and deliver on the 
specified dates . . . Firm A shall pay Firm B liquidated damages at 
the rate of [X] Euros per day of delay.’ 
- Termination/resolution clause: ‘In the event the obligations of one 
of the Parties do not comply with the articles referred to hereunder, 
the contract shall be, if required by the creditor of the said 
obligations, cancelled, by giving notice of such termination . . .’ 
 
Clauses of 
coordination 
- Assignment of roles and responsibilities: ‘All development work 
will be performed by Developer or its employees at Developer’s 
offices or by approved independent contractors who have executed 
confidentiality and assignment agreements that are acceptable to the 
Client.’ 
- Indications of duration and conditions of renewal: ‘This Agreement 
is made for a term of three years. The Agreement shall be renewed 
automatically at the end of three years unless . . .’ 
- Operational coordination related to reassignment of tasks among 
participants: ‘On completion of Phase 1, Parties agree to discuss the 
allocation of resources to the task.’ 
- Strategic coordination: ‘The 2nd-stage specific objectives will be 
defined by the Parties through mutual consultations after completion 
of the 1st-stage objectives.’ 
- Dispute resolution provision: ‘Any dispute arising out of or in 
connection with this Agreement shall be settled without recourse to 
the courts . . .’ 
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TABLE 5 
Examples of statements for relational contracts 
 
 
Type of relational 
contract 
 
Examples of statements 
 
Cooperative relational 
contract 
- ‘The parties have been working together for five months in a 
cooperative way. Mr. XYZ [the manager in charge of the project] 
especially points out ‘the collaborative and trusting atmosphere’ 
of their relationship with Firm B’s team.’ 
- ‘It is now the third time Firm A and Firm B are doing business 
together. They first worked together in 2002 on . . . They also 
worked together in 2004 for the implementation of . . . 
Technicians and engineers from both parties have developed 
strong ties. They even used to go out and play soccer together.’ 
- ‘The ABC project is the first transaction between Firm A and 
Firm B. So far, each party seems to have been really willing to 
share information on their own business. When they faced this 
issue on . . . in November, the commercial people were very 
flexible and spent much time to adapt and look for a joint 
solution.’ 
 
Competitive 
relational contract 
- ‘Firm A and Firm B started to work together in 2001. In spite of 
regular tensions, both parties look very committed into this 
relationship. According to Mr. XYZ [the CEO] and Mr. ZYX 
[the vice president], it would be unreasonable to look for another 
trading partner, especially after their investment in this unique 
400,000-Euro robot.’ 
- ‘Very soon after the beginning of the deal, parties have reported 
mutual rigidity. After the first meeting, parties reciprocally 
accused the other of rigidity and selfishness.’ 
- ‘Frictions have been frequent from the beginning of Firm A–
Firm B relationship in 2000. Firm B regularly blames unhelpful 
behavior of Firm A’s managers, while Firm A reproaches Firm A 
for being obstructive.’ 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive statistics by subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall sample 
N = 102 
Repeat exchange = 0 
N=69 
Repeat exchange = 1 
N = 33 
 
 
Cooperative relational 
contract = 1 
N = 17 
 
 
Competitive relational 
contract = 1 
N = 13 
 
 Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range  Mean S.D. Range  Mean S.D. Range 
Contractual control 
 
2.813 1.487 0-5 2.869 1.474 0-5 2.696 1.530 0-5  2.647 1.729 0-5  2.846 1.405 0-5 
Contractual 
coordination 
 
2.568 1.389 0-5 2.681 1.366 0-5 2.333 1.428 0-5  2.529 1.328 0-5  2.076 1.656 0-5 
Sum contractual 
complexity 
 
5.401 1.915 0-10 5.060 2.304 0-10 5.565 1.693 0-10  5.235 2.411 0-10  4.923 2.325 2-9 
Forms of 
opportunism at the 
onset 
 
0.490 0.502 0-1 0.492 0.503 0-1 0.484 0.507 0-1  0.529 0.514 0-1  0.461 0.518 0-1 
Intensity of strong 
form opportunism 
 
0.528 0.369 0-1 0.524 0.363 0-1 0.535 0.387 0-1  0.573 0.385 0-1  0.526 0.412 0-1 
Legal fees 
 
 
1.688 0.512 0.113-
2.330 
1.704 0.470 0.113-
2.330 
1.656 0.599 0.301-
2.324 
 
 
1.706 0.601 0.301-
2.324 
 
 
1.593 0.635 0.301-
2.283 
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TABLE 7a 
Type of contracting mechanisms and legal fees 
 
 
 Legal fees 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
     
Contractual control  -0.27*** 
(0.04) 
-0.27*** 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.04) 
Contractual coordination  -0.14*** 
(0.03) 
-0.16*** 
(0.03) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
Prior relationship   -0.18* 
(0.08) 
-0.17 
(0.24) 
Cooperative relational contract    0.09 
(0.25) 
Competitive relational contract    -0.10 
(0.25) 
Technical detail -0.07† 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Time bound -0.11 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
Asymmetry -0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
International 0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.15† 
(0.08) 
-0.17* 
(0.08) 
-0.15† 
(0.08) 
Asset specificity – Human 0.03 
(0.11) 
0.18† 
(0.09) 
0.21* 
(0.09) 
0.24* 
(0.09) 
Asset specificity – Physical -0.20† 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
Asset specificity – Site -0.15 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
Distribution -0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
Services 0.00 
(0.20) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
IT -0.02 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
Constant 2.08*** 
(0.43) 
2.85*** 
(0.38) 
2.92*** 
(0.37) 
2.77*** 
(0.39) 
R2 0.19 0.51 0.53 0.54 
Adj R2 0.11 0.44 0.46 0.46 
 
N = 102; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standards errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7b 
Types of contracting mechanisms and forms of opportunism 
 
Columns 1a to 4a: Probit (binary measure of opportunism at the onset of the dispute: strong form = 1; weak form = 0) 
Columns 1b to 4b: OLS (measure of the intensity of strong form opportunism relative to the total number of messages 
exchanged between the partners about opportunism) 
 
 Types of opportunism 
 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
Contractual control  -0.84*** 
(0.23) 
-0.87*** 
(0.24) 
-0.96*** 
(0.26) 
 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
-0.09** 
(0.03) 
-0.10** 
(0.03) 
Contractual coordination  -0.79*** 
(0.21) 
-0.92*** 
(0.23) 
-0.92*** 
(0.23) 
 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
-0.10** 
(0.03) 
-0.10** 
(0.03) 
Prior relationship   -0.72† 
(0.42) 
-1.07 
(3.21) 
  -0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
Cooperative relational contract    0.71 
(3.21) 
   0.10 
(0.22) 
Competitive relational contract    -0.07 
(3.23) 
   0.03 
(0.22) 
Technical detail -0.11 
(0.12) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Time bound -0.62* 
(0.30) 
-0.47 
(0.62) 
-0.83 
(0.67) 
-0.55 
(0.73) 
-0.17* 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
Asymmetry -0.11 
(0.15) 
-0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.13 
(0.20) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
International -0.34 
(0.29) 
-1.04** 
(0.38) 
-1.19** 
(0.41) 
-1.14** 
(0.42) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
-0.15* 
(0.07) 
-0.13† 
(0.07) 
Asset specificity – Human 0.11 
(0.33) 
0.52 
(0.39) 
0.70† 
(0.42) 
0.86† 
(0.45) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
Asset specificity – Physical -0.41 
(0.31) 
-0.10 
(0.40) 
-0.12 
(0.41) 
-0.08 
(0.41) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
Asset specificity – Site -0.78† 
(0.44) 
-0.13 
(0.52) 
0.07 
(0.55) 
-0.12 
(0.59) 
-0.18† 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
Distribution 0.35 
(0.42) 
0.04 
(0.49) 
-0.12 
(0.50) 
-0.14 
(0.50) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
Services 0.27 
(0.58) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
-0.19 
(0.69) 
-0.17 
(0.69) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
IT -0.01 
(0.41) 
-0.40 
(0.52) 
-0.59 
(0.54) 
-0.60 
(0.54) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Constant 1.69 
(1.31) 
6.31** 
(2.01) 
6.86** 
(2.14) 
6.45** 
(2.18) 
0.87** 
(0.31) 
1.35*** 
(0.32) 
1.37*** 
(0.32) 
1.31*** 
(0.34) 
LR chi2 26.27 58.47 61.54 62.73     
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.41 0.43 0.44     
R2     0.20 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Adj R2     0.11 0.24 0.24 0.22 
 
N = 102; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standards errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8 
Formal contracts by subsamples 
 
 
 Competitive 
relational contract 
 
No relational contract Cooperative 
relational contract 
More than three 
contractual control 
clauses and fewer 
than three 
coordination 
contractual clauses 
 
4 cases (i.e., 30.7% of 
the cases with 
competitive relational 
contract) 
 
21 cases (i.e., 30.4% 
of the cases with no 
relational contract) 
4 cases (i.e., 23.5% of 
the cases with 
cooperative relational 
contract) 
Fewer than three 
contractual control 
clauses and more 
than three contractual 
coordination clauses 
 
1 case (i.e., 7.7% of 
the cases with 
competitive relational 
contract) 
 
12 cases (i.e., 17.4% 
of the cases with no 
relational contract) 
5 cases (i.e., 29.4% of 
the cases with 
cooperative relational 
contract) 
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FIGURE 1 
Comparison of samples 
 
 
 
Frequency of the presence of clause x in Reuer and Arino’s (2007) sample (88 alliances involving Spanish 
firms of various sizes from a variety of industries) and Reuer et al.’s (2006) sample (66 alliances in the 
German telecommunications industry). 
 
Clause #1: periodic written reports of all relevant transactions 
Clause #2: prompt written notice of any departures from the agreement 
Clause #3: the right to examine and audit all relevant records through a firm of CPAs 
Clause #4: designation of certain information as proprietary and subject to confidentiality provisions of 
the contract 
Clause #5: non-use of proprietary information even after termination of agreement 
Clause #6: termination of agreement 
Clause #7: arbitration clauses 
Clause #8: lawsuit provisions 
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FIGURE 2a 
Plot of the messages about opportunism 
(ranked by the total number of messages about opportunism) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2b 
Plot of the messages about opportunism 
(ranked by the proportion strong versus weak about opportunism) 
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FIGURE 3 
Intensity of strong form opportunism and legal fees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intensity of 
strong form 
opportunism 
Legal fees 
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FIGURE 4a 
Clauses of contractual control: Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4b 
Clauses of contractual coordination: Distribution 
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